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THE PSYCHOLOGICAL CONSEQUENCES OF
JUDICIAL PROCEDURES: IMPLICATIONS
FOR CIVIL COMMITMENT HEARINGS
Tom R. Tyler*
key Supreme Court decision regarding involuntary civil commit-
ment hearings is Parham v. JR. 1 In Parham, the Supreme Court
ruled that minors are not entitled to a hearing prior to involuntary
admission into a state mental hospital because state psychiatrists, those
otherwise responsible for making the admissions decision, could act as a
"neutral factfinder. ' ' 2
The identification of "neutral factfinding" as the criterion against which to
evaluate the adequacy of judicial hearings is consistent with the legal litera-
ture on procedures. That literature typically focuses on issues such as bias,
honesty, and expertise.3 These aspects are regarded as important because
they are believed to influence the ability of a procedure to reach an objec-
tively correct outcome.4
An important question in determining the balance of authority in commit-
ment hearings is whether the procedural safeguards can assure neutral
factfinding.5 In commitment hearings authority can be given to professional
and/or to judicial decision-makers. Professional authority refers to the dis-
cretion given to psychiatrists or psychologists to determine mental compe-
tence, usually based on tests and interviews with the person whose
competence is in question.6 Judicial authority refers to similar discretion
* This paper is based on a presentation at the annual meeting of the American Associa-
tion of Law Schools in San Antonio, Texas, on January 5, 1992. I would like to thank Don
Bersoff, James Ellis, Daniel Shuman, and Chris Slobogin for helpful comments on that presen-
tation. The research that forms the basis for this presentation was supported by the Law and
Social Science Program of the National Science Foundation, the American Bar Foundation,
and the Dispute Resolution Research Center of the Kellogg Graduate School of Management
at Northwestern University.
1. 442 U.S. 584 (1979). Parham was not the first case to consider the therapeutic conse-
quences of commitment hearings for juveniles. For a review of the history of laws governing
the parental commitment of minors, see J.W. Ellis, Volunteering Children: Parental Commit-
ment of Minors to Mental Institutions, 62 CAL. L. REV. 840-916 (1974).
2. Parham, 442 U.S. at 606-07.
3. See TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 6-7 (1990).
4. Id.
5. Donald N. Bersoff, Judicial Deference to Nonlegal Decisionmakers: Imposing Simplis-




given to judges, typically exercised through some form of judical hearing. 7
If the key concern in devising commitment procedures is determining the
true mental state of the person in order to make the best decision about
commitment, then this balance of authority should be shaped by evaluations
of the capabilities of professional and judicial decision-makers. 8 Recent re-
search has documented many errors in clinical decision-making, suggesting
that judicial decision-making might be beneficial. 9 If future studies that di-
rectly compare the relative error rates in clinical and judicial decision-mak-
ing suggest that judicial hearings are more accurate, or lead to more
desirable errors, 10 those findings would support the use of judicial hearings.
It is also possible to draw potential criteria for evaluating commitment
procedures from a different set of criteria used for evaluating legal proce-
dures. These alternative criteria have been articulated by the Supreme
Court. In Goldberg v. Kelley I I the Supreme Court argued that welfare recip-
ients are entitled to a hearing of a particular type before their welfare bene-
fits are terminated. 12 Although primarily concerned with issues of accuracy,
the Court also recognized that termination without a hearing could be psy-
chologically harmful, potentially damaging feelings of security, dignity, and
self-worth.13 In other cases dealing with the due process rights of students
and prisoners, the Court similarly identified the possible psychological harm
of experiencing unfair procedures as a reason for granting rights to a
hearing. 14
The potential consequences of the psychological harm of experiencing un-
fair hearings is articulated most clearly in Morrissey v. Brewer.'5 In Morris-
sey the Court indicated that prisoners should be given judicial hearings
because denying them due process could cause them psychological harm (i.e.
would be antitherapeutic) and thus undermine their rehabilitation.' 6
These decisions are important because the courts recognize the impor-
tance of considering the psychological impact of judicial procedures on those
experiencing the procedures. This impact is distinct from the desire for a
neutral, fact-finding expert, such as a judge or a psychiatrist, who is expected
7. Id. One important difference between these two procedures is that judicial hearings
involve due process rights, while professional evaluations do not.
8. Id.
9. See JOHN MONAHAN & LAURENS WALKER, SOCIAL SCIENCE IN LAW: CASES AND
MATERIALS (1st ed. 1985).
10. It is important to recognize that the total amount of error in a procedure is not the
only criteria for its evaluation. The legal system deems some types of error to be more unac-
ceptable than others. For example, falsely committing a sane peson might be viewed as a more
serious error than falsely releasing an insane person.
11. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
12. Id. at 264.
13. Id. at 264-66.
14. See, e.g., Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 472 (1972) (addressing whether the "Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that a State afford an individual some
opportunity to be heard prior to revoking his parole").
15. 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
16. Id. at 484. Some state courts have also recognized similar interests of individuals.
For example, the California Supreme Court discussed those interests in People v. Ramirez, 599
P.2d 622 (Cal. 1979).
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to reach accurate decisions. 17 When conceptualized this way, due process
involves giving people judicial procedures that they will perceive as fair.
The law concerning the use of civil commitment hearings to determine
mental competence has varied greatly in the degree that it has suggested that
people are entitled to judicial hearings. In the past, such hearings, like those
involving prisoners, welfare recipients, and students, were often conducted
with minimal attention to issues of due process.18 The introduction of what
David Wexler labelled "libertarian commitment codes" has heightened con-
cerns about the due process rights of those involved in involuntary commit-
ment procedures.19 Protection of those rights requires some form of judicial
determination prior to commitment. 20
Discussions about the appropriate degree of judicial due process that
should be involved in commitment procedures raise the question of whether
attention to due process rights is wise. Attention to these rights increases
judicial authority at the expense of professional authority. Addressing this
question involves attention to both the objective quality of professional and
judicial commitment procedures and to their psychological consequences.
This discussion will focus on the psychological consequences of commitment
hearings-i.e. on the therapeutic effects of the commitment process. 21 One
potential benefit of judicial hearings is that they result in objectively better
outcomes. In addition, they may be psychologically beneficial to the person
whose conduct is under review.
I. HOW PEOPLE ARE AFFECTED BY JUDICIAL HEARINGS
The first issue to be addressed is whether the type of judicial process that
people experience influences them independently of the outcome of those
procedures. In other words, are there things about a commitment hearing
that affect people psychologically but are unrelated to the outcome of the
procedure? Does the process itself have therapeutic implications? Legal
psychologists have studied a wide variety of decision-making procedures, in-
cluding jury trials, mediation hearings, arbitration hearings, settlement con-
ferences, informal police-citizen interactions, and plea bargaining hearings,
in an effort to understand what determines how people react to their dealings
with legal authorities.22 Unfortunately, there are currently no direct exami-
nations of commitment hearings. Nonetheless, the findings of these other
studies have important implications for such hearings.
17. See Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 606 (1979).
18. See DAVID WEXLER, THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE: THE LAW AS A THERAPEU-
TIC AGENT (1990).
19. Id. at 165-87.
20. Id.
21. There is a large body of psychological literature dealing with the objective quality of
the decisions reached through varying legal procedures, in particular the use of different types
of juries. That literature will not be addressed in this paper. See Bersoff, supra note 5; JOHN
MONAHAN & LAURENS WALKER, SOCIAL SCIENCE IN LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 79 (2d
ed. 1990).
22. See E. ALLAN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL
JUSTICE (1988).
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The psychological perspective on judicial hearings builds on the classic
research of psychologist John Thibaut and attorney Laurens Walker. 23
Their studies examined how people evaluated the adversary and the inquisi-
torial trial procedures. 24 Their research focussed on procedural preferences,
specifically the types of trial procedures that people wanted to use to settle
their disputes.25
The work of Thibaut and Walker stimulated a number of studies on the
psychological consequences of personal experiences with legal authorities. 26
Of particular relevance are studies on the psychological consequences of par-
ticipating in various aspects of the judicial system.27 This body of work ex-
amines how people react to legal procedures after they have experienced
them.28 It differs from the work of Thibaut and Walker in its reactive char-
acter. Instead of choosing a procedure prior to experiencing it (i.e. expres-
sing a preference), people react to a procedure that they have already
experienced. Thus, they indicate their degree of satisfaction with the proce-
dure used to deal with their problem.
Subsequent studies also differ from the work of Thibaut and Walker by
placing greater weight on the study of real disputes.29 The original Thibaut
and Walker research utilized laboratory experimentation methods that were
heavily criticized by the legal community. 30 The studies that will be ex-
amined here involve either surveys of people reporting on their personal ex-
periences with judicial procedures or field studies of variations in legal
procedures. Field studies of this type also involve an examination of people
who have actually experienced different types of judicial proceedings.
The first important finding of studies of people's reactions to judicial pro-
cedures is that people are not primarily influenced by the outcome of their
experience, i.e. by whether they win or lose their case, whether they go to jail
or go free, or whether they pay a large fine or nothing. 31 Further, studies
suggest very little impact from the time it takes to resolve a case or the
amount of money expended in the effort. 32 The objective characteristics of
the case disposition experience have very little psychological impact. 33 An
example of these findings is the study by E. Allan Lind comparing bilateral
23. JOHN THIBAUT & LAURENS WALKER, PROCEDURAL JUSTICE: A PSYCHOLOGICAL
ANALYSIS (1975).
24. Id.
25. Id. Thibaut and Walker also dealt with the objective quality of the decisions reached
using different types of legal procedure. Id. However, their research on that topic will not be
discussed in this article.
26. LIND & TYLER, supra note 22, at 13.
27. Tom R. Tyler, The Role of Perceived Injustice in Defendants' Evaluation of Their
Courtroom Experience, 18 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 51 (1984) [hereinafter, Tyler, Role of Perceived
Injustice].
28. See, e.g., TYLER, supra note 3 (evaluating how people react to their personal exper-
iences with legal authorities).
29. See LIND & TYLER, supra note 22, at 13-40.
30. Id.
31. See E. Allan Lind et al., In the Eye of the Beholder.- Tort Litigants' Evaluations of
Their Experiences in the Civil Justice System, 24 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 953, 968-71 (1990).
32. Id. at 974.
33. Id. at 968-71, 975.
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negotiation, mediation, settlement conferences, and trials.34 That study
found that the amount of money won or lost, the duration of the case dispo-
sition process, and the costs of the process to the litigant were all largely
unrelated to judgments of fairness and satisfaction.3-
What does influence people is their assessment of the fairness of the case
disposition process. People are most strongly affected by their evaluations of
the procedure by which the outcomes are reached-i.e., by their evaluations
of the judicial process itself.36 In other words, people are affected by the way
in which decisions are made, irrespective of what those decisions are. People
are also influenced by judgments about the fairness of the outcome itself.37
The relative importance of receiving a fair outcome or experiencing a fair
procedure depends on the types of psychological consequence with which we
are concerned. If we are concerned about personal reactions, reaction to the
experience or the willingness to voluntarily accept judicial decisions, then
people are affected by both the fairness of the outcome and, independently,
by the fairness of the procedure. 38
Studies suggest that if the socializing influence of experience is the issue of
concern (i.e., the impact of participating in a judicial hearing on a person's
respect for the law and legal authorities), then the primary influence is the
person's evaluation of the fairness of the judicial procedure itself, not their
evaluations of the outcome.39 Such respect is important because it has been
found to influence everyday behavior toward the law.40 When people believe
that legal authorities are less legitimate, they are less likely to be law-abiding
citizens in their everyday lives.4 1
Many of the studies alluded to deal with informal police-citizen interac-
tions,42 and citizen experiences in small claims courts.43 These studies focus
on the experiences of ordinary citizens, whose primary interactions with the
legal system typically involve informal contacts with the police and the
courts."
Other studies have focused more directly on judicial hearings. The first is
a recent study of felony criminal case disposition.45 That study examined
34, See id. at 953-86.
35. Id. at 980-84.
36. See LIND & TYLER, supra note 22.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. TYLER, supra note 3, at 94-112. See Tom R. Tyler et al., Maintaining Allegiance
Toward Political Authorities: The Role of Prior Attitudes and the Use of Fair Procedures, 33
AM. J. OF POL. Sci. 629 (1989) (examining "the impact of experience with the criminal justice
system on defendant attitudes toward legal authorities, law, and government) [hereinafter,
Tyler, Maintaining Allegiance].
40. TYLER, supra note 3, at 4-5.
41. Id.
42. Id.; Tom R. Tyler & Robert Folger, Distributional and Procedural Aspects of Satisfac-
tion With Citizen-Police Encounter, BASIC & APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 281-92 (1980).
43. Tyler, Role of Perceived Injustice, supra note 27.
44. See TYLER, supra note 3; Tyler & Folger, supra note 42, at 281; Tyler, Role of Per-
ceived Injustice, supra note 27.
45. See Jonathan Casper et al., Procedural Justice in Felony Cases, 22 LAW & SOC'Y REV.
483 (1988).
SMU LAW REVIEW
the impact of the case disposition process on both satisfaction with the case
disposition process itself and on attitudes toward law and legal authorities.46
Although those defendants received outcomes varying from a suspended
sentence to twenty years in prison, the objective severity of the outcomes
received was not found to influence overall reactions to the case-disposition
experiences. Reactions to the case-disposition experience were influenced
by: 1) the fairness of the sentence and 2) evaluations of the fairness of the
case-disposition process. The impact of the case-disposition process on atti-
tudes toward the legal system was found to be responsive only to evaluations
of the fairness of the case-disposition process and not to judgments of dis-
tributive justice or to the objective severity of the outcome.47
These findings about the felony case disposition process are important for
several reasons. First, the deprivation of personal liberty involved is quite
substantial. Second, the people involved are marginal members of society:
poor, poorly educated, minority, unemployed; those who might be expected
to care the least about questions of due process and the most about the
favorability of the outcomes they have received.
A second set of findings are from a series of studies of civil tort case hear-
ings conducted by the Rand corporation.48 These studies examine the reso-
lution of tort cases in settlement conference hearings, mediation/arbitration
hearings, and formal trial hearings.49 The findings of Lind et al., on arbitra-
tion in the federal courts are especially striking.50 All of the cases they stud-
ied involved lawsuits over at least $50,000 and some lawsuits involved
amounts up to $2,000,000. 51 Yet they found that people's willingness to
accept mediation decisions, instead of going on to have a formal trial, were
affected by their evaluations of the fairness of the mediation session.52 Simi-
lar findings were obtained by Rand studies that examined the acceptance of
arbitration claims in lawsuits over automobile injuries in New Jersey. 53
These findings suggest that civil, like criminal, proceedings are strongly in-
fluenced by people's evaluations of procedures.
The findings of the studies I have outlined are very supportive of the spec-
ulations of the Supreme Court in the cases I have already noted, Goldberg v.
Kelley 54 and Morrissey v. Brewer.5" Experiencing judicial procedures that
are evaluated as unfair does influence people's respect for legal authorities
46. Casper, supra note 45, at 483-507; Tyler, Maintaining Allegiance, supra note 39, at
629-52.
47. Casper, supra note 45, at 483-507; Tyler, Maintaining Allegiance, supra note 39, at
629-52.
48. E. Allan Lind et al., Outcome and Process Concerns in Organizational Dispute Resolu-
tion, AM. B. FOUND. WORKING PAPER # 9109 (1991); Robert J. MacCoun et al., Rand Insti-
tute for Civil Justice, ALTERNATIVE ADJUDICATION: AN EVALUATION OF THE NEW JERSEY
AUTOMOBILE ARBITRATION PROGRAM (1988).
49. See Lind, supra note 48; MacCoun, supra note 48.
50. Lind, supra note 48.
51. Id. at 1.
52. Id. at 29.
53. MacCoun, supra note 48, at 56-57.
54. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
55. 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
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and for the law. Further, it shapes people's behavior. People who have ex-
perienced a procedure that they judge to be unfair are not only less respect-
ful of the law and legal authorities, they are less likely to accept judicial
decisions and less likely to obey the law in the future. These findings point
to the possibility of developing exactly the type of social malaise that the
Supreme Court speculated might result from experiencing an "arbitrary"
(i.e. unfair) procedure.5 6
In their original discussion of procedural justice, Thibaut and Walker sug-
gested that conducting a judicial proceeding using procedures that all parties
to a dispute would regard as fair facilitates efforts to "resolve conflicts in
such a way as to bind up the social fabric and encourage the continuation of
productive exchange between individuals." 57 Similar concerns underlie the
therapeutic jurisprudence movement. If people leave commitment hearings
with favorable views about the legitimacy of legal authorities, such views are
likely to facilitate the subsequent therapeutic process.
A. SUBJECTIVE NEUTRALITY
It is possible that people care about procedural justice but define it in
terms of neutrality such as lack of bias, honesty, the use of expertise, and
factual decision-making. If so, they share the concern with factors shaping
the objective decision-making quality that has influenced judicial holdings
such as Parham v. J.R. 58
Studies indicate that people focus on lack of bias, honesty, and factual
decision-making. 59 Each of these aspects of a judicial procedure has some
influence on judgments of the procedure's fairness. 6° In addition, people are
more likely to indicate that a procedure is fair if it yields them a favorable
outcome.
What is interesting is not that the neutrality of a judicial procedure mat-
ters-neutrality is after all a core element of procedure that forms the cen-
tral concept in most textbooks on legal procedure. What is interesting is
that there are other aspects of procedures that are more important determi-
nants of people's judgments about procedural fairness. Three such elements
will be considered: participation, dignity, and trust.
1. Participation
Studies of people's reactions to judicial procedures consistently find that
people regard procedures in which they are allowed to participate as fairer.61
Participation can involve the presentation of evidence and one's own views
56. Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 265.
57. See THIBAUT & WALKER, supra note 23.
58. 442 U.S. 584 (1979).
59. See TYLER, supra note 3, at 6-7.
60. See Tom R. Tyler & E. Allan Lind, A Rational Model of Authority in Groups, in 25
ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 115, 137-66 (Mark P. Zanna ed., 1992)
(discussing existing research on characteristics that make procedures appear fair and address-
ing features that affect procedural justice judgments).
61. See LIND & TYLER, supra note 22.
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(voice or process control), shared decision-making (decision control), or
both.62 Studies suggest that either form of participation enhances feelings of
fair treatment.63
It is not particularly surprising that people value shared control over deci-
sions. Such shared control gives them influence over the outcome of the
procedure. It is also not surprising that people value the opportunity to
present evidence and express their views. They no doubt feel that this op-
portunity to present evidence allows them to influence indirectly judicial de-
cisions through persuading the mediator or judge of the validity of their
perspective.
What is interesting is that people value the opportunity to present their
arguments and state their views even when they indicate that what they say
is having little or no influence over the third-party authority." The most
striking example of this effect is found in studies allowing people to present
their evidence after a decision has been made.65
Imagine that you are invited to visit another university because you are
being considered for a job. When you arrive your host says that he or she
has good news and bad news. The bad news is that someone else has already
been hired to fill the job. The good news is that you can still demonstrate
how good you would be for the job by giving a job talk. Would you think
that you were being more fairly treated than you would if you were simply
told that the job had been filled? Interestingly, the answer is yes. In fact,
people do place a value on the opportunity to present evidence that is not
linked to the influence of that evidence on decisions.
Obviously this example is extreme. Typically the message people receive
from authorities is much less straightforward. But the extremity of the ex-
ample makes the point clear; people do not want to state their opinions sim-
ply because they believe that their arguments will influence third-party
decisions. Presenting arguments to a third-party has value in and of itself.
2. Dignity
A second important finding of psychological research on people's reac-
tions to their dealings with legal authorities is that people care how they are
treated by legal authorities. 66 In other words, they respond to whether they
are treated with respect, politeness, and dignity, and whether their rights as
citizens are acknowledged. 67 People value the affirmation of their status by




65. E. Allan Lind et al., Voice, Control, and Procedural Justice: Instrumental and Nonin-
strumental Concerns in Fairness Judgments, 59 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 952, 952-59
(1990).
66. See TYLER, supra note 3; Tyler & Folger, supra note 42; Tyler & Lind, supra note 60.
67. See Lind, supra note 31; TYLER, supra note 3; Tyler & Folger, supra note 42; Tyler &
Lind, supra note 60.
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regard procedures as unfair if they are not consistent with that affirmation.68
To understand the effects of dignity, it is important to recognize that govern-
ment has an important role in defining people's views about their value in
society. Such a self evaluation shapes one's feelings of security and self-
respect. 69
3. Trust
Finally, people value evidence that the authorities with whom they are
dealing are concerned about their welfare and want to treat them fairly.70
Trust is the most important quality, but also the most elusive, because it
involves a motive attribution. 71 In other words, people must infer whether
an authority is or is not motivated to treat them fairly based on that author-
ity's actions.
What influences whether people regard authorities as trustworthy? One
factor is participation. People regard authorities who allow them to present
evidence as more trustworthy. 72 Similarly, people regard authorities who
treat them with dignity and respect as more trustworthy. 73 Finally, the ef-
forts of authorities to explain or account for decisions heighten judgments of
trustworthiness. 74
Concerns about trustworthiness reflect a desire to understand the future
actions of authorities.75 Since people typically believe that motives are stable
and unchanging over time, knowledge of the motivations of authorities al-
lows the authorities' future actions to be predicted. 76 If people infer a benev-
olent disposition in some authority, they can trust that, in the long-run, an
authority will behave in ways that serve their interests.77 For this reason
trust is a key component of legitimacy.78
The importance of trustworthiness helps to explain an important limita-
tion to the participation effects that have been outlined. People generally
feel more fairly treated if they can present evidence, even when they think
their evidence does not affect the decisions made by the third party. How-
ever, this effect does not occur if people do not believe that their evidence
was considered by the third party. Without considering their arguments,
people believe that the authority cannot be acting benevolently, and no effect
occurs.
The role of trustworthiness also leads to another important conclusion of
the study of procedures. Structural features of procedures, such as the pro-
68. See Tyler & Lind, supra note 60, at 139-43.
69. Robert Lane, Procedural Goods in a Democracy: How One is Treated v. What One
Gets, 2 Soc. JUST. RES. 177-92 (1988).








78. BERNARD BARBER, THE LOGIC AND LIMrrs OF TRUST (1983).
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vision of a right to appeal, may or may not shape people's feelings about
authorities. The key issue to those affected by procedures is whether the
authority involved is attempting to be fair in the implementation of rules.7 9
Without such a belief the simple existence of structures associated with fair-
ness does not enhance perceived fairness.80 On the other hand, people can
experience "unfair treatment" such as sexism or racism without reporting
that the procedures involved were unfair if they infer that the authorities
involved are motivated to treat them fairly.8 1
B. SUMMARY
People's evaluations of the fairness of judicial hearings are affected by the
opportunities which those procedures provide for people to participate, by
the degree to which people judge that they are treated with dignity and re-
spect, and by judgments about the trustworthiness of authorities. Each of
these three factors has more influence on judgments of procedural justice
than do either evaluations of neutrality or evaluations of the favorableness of
the outcome of the hearing.
II. THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUDICIAL HEARINGS
Why do those who experience judicial hearings react to issues of participa-
tion, dignity, and trustworthiness? The answer lies in recognizing the im-
portant role that legal and political authorities play in defining peoples'
feelings of self-esteem, self-worth, and their sense of personal security.
In a study of the citizens of Chicago, people were found to recognize a
widespread occurrence of injustice when citizens dealt with the police and
courts.82 Yet the same people almost universally indicated that they be-
lieved the authorities would treat them fairly if they personally dealt with
them.8 3 Tyler and Lind label this belief the "illusion of personal justice"
because it reflects a strong belief in one's own invulnerability to unfair treat-
ment.8 4 Faye Crosby identified a similar unwillingness to recognize that one
is a victim of discrimination, which she labels "comfortable ignorance."'8 5 In
each case, people resist the belief that they are vulnerable, instead seeing
themselves as linked to personally benevolent authorities.8 6 When people
deal with authorities, they open these beliefs to possible disconfirmation.8 7
79. Tom R. Tyler & Robert Bies, Interpersonal Aspects of Procedural Justice, in APPLIED
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY IN BUSINESS SETrINGS (J.S. Carroll ed., 1990).
80. See Tyler & Lind, supra note 60, at 139-43.
81. See TYLER, supra note 3, at 91-92.
82. See Tyler & Lind, supra note 60, at 144-58.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 155.
85. Faye Crosby, Relative Deprivation in Organizational Settings, in 6 RESEARCH IN OR-
GANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR (L.L. Cummings & Barry M. Staw eds., 1984); see also Faye
Crosby, The Denial of Personal Discrimination, in AMERICAN BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST 371;
Faye Crosby & Donna Nagata, Denying Personal Advantage (paper presented at the annual
meeting of the International Society of Political Psychology, Washington, D.C.) (1990).
86. Tyler & Lind, supra note 60, at 155.
87. Id. at 155 n.19.
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The importance of self-respect and self-worth is indicated by the centrality
of those issues to people's reactions to their experiences with authorities.
People may initially approach authorities instrumentally, but they react to
their experiences by focusing on their implications for the social bond link-
ing people to authorities.8 8
The legal system is one aspect of the larger society, so legal authorities
provide people with information about their standing both in the eyes of the
law and in society more generally. Research shows that people care about
their status and react to their experiences in terms of their implications con-
cerning that status. 89 In contrast, people's concerns about traditional issues
such as lack of bias, honesty, factual decision-making, and obtaining
favorable outcomes, while important, have less influence on people's judg-
ments regarding the fairness of their experiences. 90
A. COMMITMENT HEARINGS
I have discussed a number of studies examining the psychology underlying
people's reactions to their dealings with legal authorities. None of these
studies directly examines commitment hearings. However, they do examine
a variety of legal procedures, including mediation/arbitration hearings, tri-
als, and plea bargaining, which share many basic characteristics with com-
mitment hearings.
The key question is what implications can be drawn from this literature
regarding the therapeutic consequences of personal experiences with legal
authorities. One implication is that people respond to how decisions are
made-a response that is not simply linked to what decisions are. Hence,
the psychological arena defined by the Supreme Court in cases such as
Goldberg v. Kelly91 and Morrissey v. Brewer92 clearly exists.
Failure to receive due process has a number of negative consequences for
people who have personal experiences with legal authorities, including reluc-
tance to accept decisions, diminished respect for the judge, mediator, or
other third party, diminished respect for the courts and the legal system, and
a diminished willingness to follow legal rules.9 3 These effects are completely
consistent with the suggestion that experiencing arbitrary procedures leads
to social malaise and decreases people's willingness to be integrated into the
polity, accepting its authorities and following its rules.
Of particular relevance to the question of therapeutic implications is the
issue of behavior. Enhancing respect for authorities, the willingness to vol-
untarily accept the decisions of authorities, and the willingness to follow so-
cial rules are core objectives of any therapeutic program. Hence, it seems
likely that future studies of the therapeutic consequences of judicial hearings
88. See William Felstiner et al., The Emergence and Transformation of Disputes: Naming,
Blaming, Claiming... , 15 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 631 (1973).
89. See Tyler & Lind, supra note 60, at 144-66.
90. Id.
91. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
92. 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
93. See TYLER, supra note 3.
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will demonstrate that commitment hearings experienced as unfair by those
potentially being committed will have strongly antitherapeutic
consequences.
The findings of studies about fair process have especially important impli-
cations for the study of commitment hearings. Judicial hearings in general
are clearly used by people to gain information about their status as members
of society. Perhaps no type of hearing more directly threatens a person's
belief that they are an equal member of society than a mental commitment
hearing. Given the stigma attached to "insanism, '94 the label "mentally in-
competent" is truly a threat to individual's ability to define themselves as an
equal member of society.95 Many groups affected by judicial and adminis-
trative hearings, welfare recipients, prisoners, and students are socially mar-
ginal in some respects. For those and other groups the issue of mental
competence is central to issues of self-respect and security in society.
B. PROFESSIONAL VS. JUDICIAL DECISION-MAKING
The psychological perspective that has been outlined highlights the impor-
tance of conducting judicial hearings in ways that will have positive psycho-
logical consequences on those who undergo commitment hearings. In other
words, it is clearly beneficial for personal experiences with judicial authori-
ties to contribute to developing psychological and behavioral characteristics
that enhance the therapeutic process. The enhancement of such attitudes
and behaviors will, of course, be beneficial irrespective of the disposition of
the case (i.e., whether the person involved is or is not committed to a mental
institution).
It is also important to note, however, that the characteristics of a hearing
that are associated with fairness can be enacted by either judicial or profes-
sional decision-makers. In other words, the psychological research reviewed
suggests that people will benefit from hearings in which they can participate,
in which they are treated with dignity, and in which they believe that they
are dealing with trustworthy authorities who are motivated to be fair to
them. It seems possible to design either judicial or professional decision-
making procedures, or both, so that they will have the characteristics of
"fair" decision-making procedures.
The findings outlined are consistent with the suggestion of the therapeutic
jurisprudence literature that hearings which lack the characteristics which
people associate with due process are likely to be experienced as unfair. 96
Such unfairness, in turn, is likely to have negative consequences for the sub-
sequent therapeutic process. However, it does not point to judicial hearings
as the only possible source of procedures that people will experience as un-
fair. It is also possible that professionals could develop procedures contain-
ing some of the elements that have been outlined. If they did so, then
professional decision-making procedures might also be therapeutic. It is an
94. See Michael L. Perlin, On "Sanism", 46 SMU L. REV. 373 (1992).
95. Id.
96. See Wexler, supra note 18.
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empirical question, as yet unanswered, whether mental health professionals
could conduct commitment proceedings in ways that would lead people to
feel that their views were being considered, that they were being treated with
dignity and respect, and that they were dealing with trustworthy authorities.
C. OBJECTIVE AND PSYCHOLOGICAL CRITERIA FOR PROCEDURAL
EVALUATION
There are two distinct issues that need to be considered in evaluating civil
commitment procedures. The first is the ability of a procedure to make ac-
curate decisions. Bersoff has outlined the problems, including bias, with
professional decision-making in great detail.97 If future studies indicate that
professional decision-making is more subject to such biases and consequently
less accurate than judicial decision-making, then accuracy concerns would
favor judicial decision-making.
Distinct from accuracy issues are concerns about the psychological impact
of procedures, in particular their potential impact on future therapeutic
processes. If people become estranged from authority, distrusting others;
believing that they are vulnerable, and hence feeling insecure; and lacking in
feelings of self-worth, these consequences are disadvantageous and prefera-
bly could be avoided. Historically, many of these negative psychological
consequences have occurred in the context of professional commitment hear-
ings. Judicial hearings, which have been more sensitive to issues of due pro-
cess, may have more positive psychological consequences. Ultimately,
decisions about the desirability of different judicial procedures need to be
responsive to both the objective quality of the decisions made and to the
psychological consequences of varying types of decision-making procedure.
97. Bersoff, supra note 5.
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